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From the Chairman
Welcome to the first issue of the
Philosophy Faculty’s Newsletter. We
plan to publish it annually.
The Faculty has now settled into its
new premises at the top of the Raised
Faculty Building, a move to which so
many of you contributed so
generously. And we are already
looking to expand a little further. The
English Faculty has a splendid (or do
I just mean huge?) new building,
which means that all the space
occupied by their library in the RFB
will shortly become vacant.
It isn’t just architecturally that we are
broadening out – we are also
hammering at the walls between
academic philosophy and the rest of
the world. Professor Blackburn’s
introductory book Think has sold
well over 100,000 copies and been
translated into more than a dozen
languages. And an exciting new
venture, the Forum for Philosophy in
Business (see p. 2) is gathering
momentum.
With University funding even more
uncertain than usual the Faculty is
seeking greater financial
independence. A project is afoot to
find endowment-money for the
Professorship previously held by
Wittgenstein. Please wish us luck –
and remember us when you win the
National Lottery … 
We hope you enjoy the Newsletter.
Our grateful thanks to those who
have contributed to it.
Edward Craig FBA
Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy, 
Chairman of the Philosophy Faculty
Board
WRITING ABOUT SIN 
Simon Blackburn
When, eighteen months ago, I was
asked to give a public lecture on one of
the Seven Deadly Sins, in a series
jointly mounted by the New York
Public Library and Oxford University
Press, several sins had already been
bagged. I was offered the choice of
sloth, anger, or lust. Each was
tempting, and each had a good
philosophical pedigree. But I felt that
only lust had star quality.
I had scarcely accepted when I
became aware of my disqualifications
as a middle-aged (at best), academic,
male, heterosexual, English
grandfather. Practically a paid-up
member of the patriarchy, how could I
move a step without outraging
feminists, queer theorists, victims and
campaigners for victims, of every hue?
I saw myself driven from the stage for
using the wrong pronoun. I saw armies
of therapists offering me help. And
then, what should I expect from the
New York audience? There was the
fate of my distinguished Cambridge
predecessor, Bertrand Russell, who in
1941 was stripped of his appointment
at the College of the city of New York,
after a macabre witch-hunt, on the
grounds that his works were
‘lecherous, libidinous, lustful,
venerous, erotomaniac, aphrodisiac,
irreverent, narrow-minded, untruthful
and bereft of moral fiber’. 
My general thesis was to be that
Lust should be shifted from the
category of Sin to that of Virtue.
David Hume defined a virtue as
any quality of mind that is useful
or agreeable to ourselves or
others. Lust qualifies in spades.
But my leading witness was the
philosopher Thomas Hobbes,
who said that 
The appetite which men call
lust…is a sensual pleasure, but
not only that; there is in it also a
delight of the mind: for it consisteth
of two appetites together, to please,
and to be pleased; and the delight 
men take in delighting, is not sensual, 
but a pleasure or joy of the mind
consisting in the imagination of the
power they have so much to please.
I also enjoyed contrasting the
standard Platonic story of ascent,
whereby lust for sex with an individual
politely gives way to an abstract love
of beauty, with the more earthy
Shakespearean view in which erotic
love is the domain of unreasonable
dotings, fiction, madness, bubbles, and
illusion. It is not so obvious why we
ought to prefer the latter, which leaves
it an option that we ought to take our
lust neat. 
Writing up the lecture for
publication proved surprisingly
difficult. Academic philosophy, let
alone theology, is no friend to the light
touch, and at times it seemed hard to
bear the relentless disapproval of
Augustine, Aquinas and Kant. I won’t
spoil the ending, but on the whole
humanity does not come out too badly.  
Simon Blackburn FBA
Professor of Philosophy. His book
Lust is part of the The Seven Deadly
Sins series, and it is published by
OUP, 2004.
Walter Crane (1845–1915), Beauty and the Beast 
B
y 
pe
rm
is
si
on
 o
f t
he
 S
yn
di
cs
 o
f
C
am
br
id
ge
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 L
ib
ra
ry
Philosophy at Cambridge page 2 May 2004
I Head in the clouds or feet on
the ground?
Philosophy’s reputation for ethereal
contemplation is as old as the subject itself.
Yet many philosophers have engaged directly
in the practical world: Locke, Smith, Bentham, 
Mill and Russell are obvious examples. 
The truth is that, for all its abstractions,
philosophy confronts issues underlying many
decisions now facing professionals, business
leaders and policy makers.
II Examples
Trust in business, government and the media
is sharply declining. Forms of managerial
accountability are supposed to restore it. But
the resulting ‘audit explosion’ has done more
harm than good, and trust keeps declining.
In her 2002 Reith Lectures, Onora O’Neill
viewed the problem from a philosophical
perspective. Autonomous individuals should
place trust intelligently, not blindly.
Intelligent trust requires evidence of
trustworthiness, but this evidence is not
automatically delivered by accountability, if
that simply means demanding ever more
information. Information must be intelligible
and its authors properly interrogated,
otherwise opacity, not transparency, will
result. Before steps can be taken to restore
trust, O’Neill shows the need to think
through these concepts of trust,
accountability and transparency. Her views
are now resonating with practitioners.
There are many other cases where
addressing abstract problems can
lead to practical results.
Intellectual property is a topical
example. Lawyers and economists
dominate the field. Yet at its heart
lie conceptual distinctions that
need philosophical attention. For
example, there is increasing
pressure to patent gene sequences:
how else can businesses be
persuaded to invest in R&D?
Legally, only inventions, not
discoveries, are patentable. So
isolated sequences are now being
treated as inventions. But the
arguments for this move are
specious. It is also surprising that
much of the argument about intellectual
property rights simply assumes
utilitarianism, a theory which Bernard
Williams declared to be on its last legs in
1973. A premature verdict perhaps, but a
good dose of scepticism about the theory
would certainly enhance the debate.
Another example is ‘corporate social
responsibility’ (CSR). Corporate websites are
awash with talk of responsibilities to society
and the environment. But disagreement is
also rife. While BP and Shell are CSR
devotees, ExxonMobil’s Chairman protests:
‘we don’t invest to make social statements at
the expense of shareholder return’. Milton
Friedman denounced CSR as ‘pure and
adulterated socialism’, yet the left complains
that it usurps the proper role of government.
Behind these political quarrels are questions
about the coherence of ascribing corporate
responsibilities, and about the proper way to
discharge them. There is also a problem of
trust here. CSR talk is easily construed as
cynical PR: looking good rather being good.
Call it the ‘Cosmethics Business’. And why
trust corporations which seek ethical
reputations, when individuals doing the same
would be deemed smug and opportunistic? 
III The Forum
These examples show that philosophy can
and should do more to engage with practical
problems. The Forum for Philosophy in
Business was established last year by two
Faculty members, Alex Oliver and Dominic
Scott, with inspiration from Maurice Biriotti,
a Cambridge alumnus now running a
consultancy (SHM). He continues to give
advice and encouragement. The Forum’s
purpose is to bring together academic
philosophers with practitioners in business,
the professions and public life. It also aims to
create new links with neighbouring academic
disciplines.
IV Activities
In November 2003, the Forum held a
seminar on intellectual property with
philosophers, lawyers, and business
strategists. In January 2004, a workshop on
corporate governance was jointly run by the
Forum, Cambridge’s Centre for Business
Research and LSE’s Centre for Analysis of
Risk and Regulation. Among the participants
were representatives from the Foundation for
Independent Directors, Reuters, accountants
BDO Stoy Hayward, and The Change
Partnership.
Supported by a Faculty Award from IBM,
the Forum is running a seminar series on
trust throughout 2004. Participants include
Sir Patrick Cormack MP, Dr David Halpern
(Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit), Dame
Patricia Hodgson (Committee for Standards
in Public Life), Sir David Omand (Security
and Intelligence Co-ordinator), Professor
Onora O’Neill (Principal of Newnham
College), Mr Chris Swinson (Senior Partner,
BDO Stoy Hayward), Lord Wilson (former
Cabinet Secretary) and Sir Robin Young
(Permanent Secretary, DTI).
V Intellectual fundraising
The Forum aims to facilitate dialogue.
Philosophy has a great deal of untapped
resources to offer practitioners and, as we
have learned, practitioners have as much to
offer philosophers. Which is where you, the
alumni, come in. Doubtless you have asked
whether your philosophical education has
made any difference to the way you do your
job. You may also know of practical issues
that philosophy should examine and make
more of. Our aim is to create a dialogue with
interested alumni on just these points. 
Next year, we shall be organizing an
alumni open day, with talks from alumni
and academic philosophers, allowing
opportunities for discussion and debate, as
well as for catching up. If you are interested
in participating – or in the Forum more
generally – please write and tell us about
yourself: when you studied philosophy, what
you have done since and which
philosophical topics you think the Forum
should tackle.
Alex Oliver and Dominic Scott
For information about the Forum, 
see www.phil.cam.ac.uk
The Forum can be contacted at the
Faculty’s address or via email [phil-
forum@lists.cam.ac.uk].
The Forum
for philosophy in business
Cambridge Centenary 
Conferences
Events
Annual Heffer Lecture
Professor Ronald Dworkin delivered
the annual Heffer Lecture – Truth,
Morality and Interpretation – on 22
April 2004.
Conference on Mathematical Knowledge
Dr Michael Potter is organising a
conference on Mathematical
Knowledge together with Drs
Alexander Paseau, Mary Leng and
Dominic Gregory. The conference will
be held at Fitzwilliam College from 30
June-2 July 2004
8th National Postgraduate Analytic
Philosophy conference
The Annual Conference of the
National Postgraduate Analytic
Philosophy Association (NPAPA) will
be at Magdalene College, from 2 July
to 4 July 2004. The Keynote Speaker
will be Professor Onora O’Neill.
The Royal Institute of Philosophy
Annual Conference 2004
The Royal Institute of Philosophy
2004 Conference is entitled ‘Preference
– Formation and well-being’. It is
organised by Dr Serena Olsaretti and
Dr Ross Harrison and will be held at
St. John’s College from 14 July to 16
July 2004.
Faculty of Philosophy Alumni Open Day
An exhibition, refreshments and
informal discussions with members of
the Faculty. Full details can be found
on the Faculty website (click on
Alumni) or contact Mrs Angela Elliott
– email: ae215@cam.ac.uk, tel: 01223
330525 or Mrs Mariella Pellegrino –
email: mp10004@cam.ac.uk, tel:
01223 331889.
During 2003 the Faculty celebrated
two major philosophical centenaries,
both of which were marked by an
international conference.
From 30 June to 2 July, the Ramsey
Centenary Conference took place in
Newnham College to mark the
centenary of Frank Ramsey’s birth.
Ramsey died in 1930 at the early age
of 26, by which time he had done
groundbreaking work in philosophy,
mathematics, and economics, and also
been (the 14 years older)
Wittgenstein’s graduate supervisor.
The papers at the conference covered 
a broad range of Ramsey’s work
across these three disciplines, as well
as his personal interest in
psychoanalysis. The conference
attracted speakers from the UK,
France, Sweden, USA, and Australia,
including Simon Blackburn, 
John Forrester, 
Hugh Mellor, 
Michael Potter and
Partha Dasgupta
(Cambridge), Dorothy
Edgington and Daniel
Isaacson (Oxford),
Fraser Macbride 
(St Andrews), Peter
Sullivan (Stirling),
Jerome Dokic and
Pascal Engel (Paris),
Wlodek Rabinowitz
(Lund), Pierre Cruse
(Louvain), Hartry
Field (New York),
and Frank Jackson
(Australian National
University). The
Cambridge
conference was followed by similar
events in Paris and Vienna later in the
year. A volume of essays based on the
Cambridge conference is currently in
preparation under the title Ramsey’s
Legacy, and will be edited by Hugh
Mellor and Hallvard Lillehammer.
On 15 November 2003, the
Principia Ethica Centenary Conference
took place in King’s College to mark
the publication of G. E. Moore’s most
influential book. It is famous not only
for the notorious argument against 
the so-called ‘naturalistic fallacy’, but
also for its theory of value and its
influence on the Bloomsbury group,
one member of which (Keynes)
described the book as ‘better than
Plato’. Principia Ethica stands as a
watershed in the history of ethics, and
was arguably the most influential work
in English speaking moral philosophy
in the 20th Century. While its
centenary was marked by more than
one conference in the USA, the
Cambridge event was the only one of
its kind in the UK. The speakers at the
event were Tom Baldwin (York),
Jonathan Dancy (Reading), and
Stephen Darwall (Michigan). Darwall,
who was visiting Cambridge from the
USA especially for this conference at
the invitation of the King’s College
Research Centre, rounded off his stay
by presenting work for his
forthcoming book on ethics both to
the Philosophy Faculty Graduate
Seminar and to the Moral Sciences
Club.
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Centenary Conference.
Hallvard Lillehammer
University Lecturer in Philosophy
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We want to hear
from you!
The Editor welcomes all
comments and suggestions or
material for future editions of the
Newsletter. Please contact:
Mrs Mariella Pellegrino
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Cambridge
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge
CB3 9DA
U.K.
Phone: +44 1223 331889
Fax: +44 1223 335091
email: mp10004@cam.ac.uk
A downloadable version of the
Newsletter is available from the
Faculty website:
http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/
A Student’s View of Cambridge Phi
Richard 
point of intimidation. It is true that he
read his lectures word-for-word twice
over for our dictation; but I can’t swear
that he read the jokes three times to
make it clear they were jokes.
Meetings of the Moral Sciences
Club, held in Richard Braithwaite’s
rooms in Kings (No 3 on H staircase)
were serious occasions, most often
with detailed points on recondite topics
which would be hard to appreciate; but
they were enjoyable and occasionally
there would be drama. In the famous
poker incident, the year before
(actually 25 October 1946),
Wittgenstein, who was chairing the
meeting, picked up and brandished the
possibly red hot poker, on some
accounts waving it around for
emphasis but on others threatening the
visiting speaker, Sir Karl Popper. This
was a clash of basically different ideas
of what philosophy is about; each held
with passion by the proponents and
their supporters. Wittgenstein urged
(though perhaps never quite proved)
that philosophy cannot solve problems,
though may resolve linguistic
confusions producing puzzles.
Evidently he would become extremely
annoyed with people claiming to make
significant remarks on what for him
could not be said. This was Popper’s
sin. Popper was an outsider, battling in
this charmed arena where the chosen
few took turns for attention, with
commanding gestures, but pretty well
ignored the surrounding world. There
were, however, some exceptions such
as the distinguished American
logicians. Having been present at a few
meetings, one learned to anticipate
from the preliminary gestures which
line of argument was about to emerge.
The primary division was between
Wittgensteinians and the Broadians.
Wittgenstein’s gesture of holding his
forehead in his hands, apparently
looking inwards with a long period of
enforced silence, was embodied by
John Wisdom and no doubt remains
immortal in his successors. Professor
Broad and his acolytes would throw
back the head with the arms upraised,
as though looking for external
revelation. 
There was plenty of underlying
mythology. It was known to us that
Professor Broad, who had Newton’s
old rooms in Trinity, would call up
Newton’s spirit in nightly ceremonies.
It was also known that John Wisdom
would tempt fate at the Newmarket
I came up to Cambridge just after the
Second World War, in 1947, to read
Moral Sciences. For Part I this was
Philosophy, Logic, Ethics, Psychology.
For Part II I read Psychology, under
Professor Sir Frederic Bartlett FRS. I
was fortunate to stay in Cambridge for
twenty years: first research in the MRC
Applied Psychology Unit, then a
University Lectureship in Experimental
Psychology, which set the course of my
life’s career mixing experiments with
some attempts in philosophy. Now 80,
I remain active in Bristol with a Senior
Research Fellowship allowing me to
continue experimenting and writing,
though without formal teaching. This
is a great way to go.
Because of the war that had just
ended, most of us were several years
older than normal for students, and the
contrast from the Services to
Cambridge was intoxicating beyond
description. I couldn’t believe my luck
when Downing College accepted me.
My father and both grandfathers had
been to Cambridge, but during the
nearly six years of my mute inglorious
time in the RAF, it seemed impossible I
would follow suit. Actually, by a
strange chance I was not entirely mute,
as I was posted by the Air Ministry to
explain war-time technologies of
communication to the public in an
ambitious Air Force exhibition, in the
John Lewis bomb site in Oxford Street
in 1945. This perhaps led to an interest
in presenting science to the public,
founding the Exploratory hands-on
Science Centre forty years later. But
nothing made up for the failing to be a
fighter pilot, due to an ear operation
while at school, though of course this
might have been life saving twice-over.
What Cambridge philosophy was
like at that time, is brilliantly described
in Wittgenstein’s Poker by David
Edmonds and John Eidinow. Here are
the wonderful characters I knew – all
except Wittgenstein who had just left,
ill, for Ireland. He returned to
Cambridge, but as a recluse in Dr
Bevan’s house, and never seen at any
rate by us, even though we knew Dr
Bevan’s consulting room with its Blue
oar on the wall. We lived in the
turbulent stern-wave of Wittgenstein.
He was a haunting presence,
materialised by John Wisdom in his
remarkable lectures. Wittgenstein’s
ideas were a voice in our minds,
though his writings had not yet
appeared in print. A tattered, typed
version of the Blue Book (or the Brown
Book?) was circulated but closely
guarded by John Wisdom’s students. I
got no more than a surreptitious
glance. 
Our teachers were extraordinarily
varied personalities; devoted to issues
philosophical, and commendably
willing to show and share with us their
mental treasures. Supervisions, when
our essays were dissected in depth and
detail, could be exciting excursions
into their adventures of understanding,
as well as grounding on our shoals of
ignorance. My main Supervisor was Dr
Alfred Ewing, who though the least
exciting, I owe a lasting debt, as he
enforced discipline by demanding
essays on uncongenial topics, showing
one how to dig out or create interest as
one went along. Richard Braithwaite
(later Professor) supervised me for one
term, inspiring a lasting interest in the
philosophy of science. John Wisdom
was the most remarkable character and
truly histrionic lecturer. I still don’t
know how seriously to take him, as he
was more therapist than teacher, but he
was a strong influence. He would
conjure and live for weeks or months
with an image, such as: Other Minds
are, and are not, like a fire on the
horizon. He would tell us the mind is
not a thing, and – usefully – go on to
examine what an acceptable thing
might be. He loved creating and
resolving puzzles, his somewhat hidden
attachment to psychoanalysis being
integral to his thinking and teaching.
Professor C D Broad was utterly
different, impressive almost to the
Philosophy at Cambridge page 4 May 2004
races. Richard and his wife Margaret
Braithwaite (Richard came nearest to
being a saint than anyone I have ever
met) practiced occult ceremonies, with
mystic signs on the floor in a local
windmill. They were all vivid
personalities and were most generous
to their students, socially and
intellectually. Ewing stood somewhat
alone, living in a tiny house with his
mother and apparently with no social
life. He was an ‘old fashioned’ Idealist,
a Kantian scholar, and deep believer in
objective standards of ethics. He
disputed Ayer-type Logical Positivism
(that for a proposition to be
meaningful, it must be testable for
truth or falsity) with a delightful
argument on Is there Life After Death?
– which made him twinkle: “After my
death I would be able to confirm
continuing consciousness, but not its
absence. As only the ‘yes there is life
after death’ alternative is verifiable –
yet the proposition is clearly
meaningful – the Verification Principle
must be false”. This amused his peers
and students but they seemed not to
take it seriously. Topics of conversation
with Dr Ewing were limited to two:
Table Tennis and the Lake District. Yet
he was an excellent supervisor,
especially for those of us who lacked
academic discipline and skills, through
leaving school early. (I missed the sixth
form, filling sand bags to protect
buildings, farm-boying, and teaching
old ladies how to deal with incendiary
bombs with a stirrup pump). Though
physically a little man, Dr Ewing wore
enormous boots. Listening to one’s
weekly essay in front of the gas fire in
his little, far too hot sitting room, the
boots would rise up in the air, as he
looked for interesting propositions in
the ill-written sentences. The huge
black boots would rise highest with
challenges to objective ethics. He
confessed to responsibility for starting
the first war. As he told me, in 1914 he
gave a lecture at St. Anne’s, near
Blackpool, and the war started a day
or so later. He didn’t visit St Anne’s
again until 1939 – the second war
immediately started. So induction
suggested he caused the second war,
and he looked guilty. We unfairly
called Dr Ewing ‘a sheep in sheep’s
clothing’. He defended his ground with
a quiet dignity I at least found
impressive.
Bertrand Russell, who was then 76,
came to Cambridge each Thursday. He
gave two very well attended lectures
during the day, one on non-
demonstrative logic and the other on
ethics, which he said were the hardest
to write. He also saw six of us for an
hour or so, in his Trinity room over the
gateway in Whewell’s Court,
overlooking the elms just re-planted
after 400 years. We sat on sofas, the
great man on his own, with two pipes
alternately smoking and cooling for re-
filling. At that time he was involved
not so much with philosophy and
logic, as the future of Europe and
especially which of the great powers
would move in and control Berlin. This
was rather disappointing for us, for we
were not interested in war or politics;
we were seeking Absolute Truth, and
here we were, sharing sofas with the
immortal Master who had sorted out
the basis of logic and mathematics. But
he would warm to comments and
questions on Wittgenstein. We got the
feeling that he did not really want
Wittgenstein to be accepted by us as
the Philosopher of the Twentieth
century. Lord Russell was well aware
of his own eminence and
wished to preserve it for the
future, and why not?
On one occasion which I
remember particularly, a pile
of his newly-written Human
Knowledge: Its Scope and
Limits stood on the floor. For
once I raised a worthwhile
question: how to justify the
prior probability of 0.5 to get
the Keynes method of
induction going. The great
man picked up the volume on
top of the pile, signed it, and
gave it to me with a smile. I
treasure the book to this day.
The last of his philosophical
works, it is I think an
important account of the basis
of scientific knowledge from
inductive inference, though it
never really took off.
We were not expected to
read much of classical
philosophy – the emphasis
being on thinking, and
formulating our questions and
tentative answers – but I was
attracted by Berkeley’s
Dialogues to issues of
perception, and especially how
perceptions are related to what
seems to be perceived in the
external world of objects. But I
felt there was lack of appreciation of
the many rich and interesting
phenomena of perception. So moving
into psychology was not a turning
away from philosophy, but rather
trying to develop and test philosophical
ideas with experiments. The old term
Experimental Philosophy which is still
used in Scotland is very appropriate.
This is not the place to recount what
happened in the more than fifty years
between reading Moral Sciences (as it
was then called) and now; but briefly, I
rejected Idealism, and the Direct
relation of ‘naïve’ Realism; coming up
with the notion that perceptions are
predictive hypotheses of what is out
there, actively created by the brain,
from general rules and knowledge of
kinds of events and objects. I put this
notion, that perceptions are hypotheses
somewhat like hypotheses of science,
to a major philosophical meeting in
1971, but it fell like a lead balloon
without leaving a discernible mark in
the world of philosophy. To me the
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continued on page 8
ilosophy Post-Wittgenstein, 1947-9
Gregory
From Sir Michael Scholar KCB (St.
John’s, 1960) President, St. John’s
College, Oxford 
I recall attending (in the early 1960s) a
lecture by Dr Ewing on time, in which he
discussed the logical impossibility of time
going backwards. The lecture took place in
a lecture room in the then very new
Sidgwick site. As he came to his conclusion
the clock on the wall stopped, then began
to go backwards, at increasing speed.
Professor Wisdom’s occasional
appearances in the lecture theatre dressed
in hunting pink (the colour itself being
used as a philosophical example), were not
regarded as particularly newsworthy at the
time. His Socratic (or Cambridge Moral
Sciences?) method of lecturing could
sometimes be disconcerting to
unsuspecting students. I remember him
addressing the question “Is it possible to
feel what another feels?” to us all – no
reply – question repeated – again no reply
– then he moved towards the front row
and put his face, held in his hands, very
close in front of a terrified undergraduate,
repeating the question and adding “That is
not a rhetorical question”.
From Mr Richard Fries (King’s, 1959)
Former Chief Charity Commissioner,
now Visiting Fellow at the Centre for
Civil Society at the London School of
Economics
When I came to Cambridge in 1959 the
Moral Sciences faculty (as it was then
called) was still under the shadow of
Wittgenstein. Its professors were Richard
Braithwaite and John Wisdom, the latter in
particular Wittgenstein’s living
representative in Cambridge (and the
embodiment of the agonised questioning
philosopher of popular imagination). The
faculty was small – perhaps a total of 50
undergraduates – but remarkably diverse,
from AC Ewing to Casimir Lewy (whose
uncompromising introductory lectures
quickly sorted out those fit for logic) and
even CD Broad occasionally emerging
from a retirement said to be devoted to the
paranormal. For me the course Jonathan
Bennett gave on Kant’s Analytic, vivid and
engaging like the book which came out of
it, made a lasting impression.
Oxford dominated British philosophy
then and visits from Elizabeth Anscombe
and Bernard Williams, perhaps testing the
climate, enlivened the proceedings of the
Moral Sciences Club. But at that time
much of our syllabus – like our required
text on ethics (PH Nowell Smith) –
seemed, as Iris Murdoch memorably
expressed it, ‘dry’, avoiding the ‘thickness’
of moral life – look there in vain for
philosophical engagement with lust, or
even trust!
I had the good fortune, however, to be
supervised by Michael Tanner, not yet a
lecturer, opening up wider visions of
philosophy while keeping me (more or
less!) to the syllabus. And sharing
accommodation with Myles Burnyeat in
my last year was a close encounter with
commitment to philosophical rigour.
never before seen an escapee from
Stalinism. The books in the library were
shelved by the first letter of the author’s
name, starting at ‘A’ in let us say the
North-East upper corner, reachable only
with an antique ladder, and continuing to
‘Z’ in some dingy lowest other corner. The
strange man took it all in instantly, grasped
the ladder, mounted to the first ‘A’, opened
the first book, scanned it for a couple of
minutes, slapped it shut, and went on to
the next. And so a morning passed, my
first introduction to one of the more
remarkable thinkers I have had the
occasion to meet. 
From Lord Cobbold (Trinity, 1957)
Chairman and Managing Director,
Lytton Enterprises Ltd.
Casimir Lewy was a very special
person. I was fortunate to have him as my
tutor and my study of philosophy from
1957 to 1960 would have been a lot less
interesting without his support and
encouragement.
His weekly lecture on Thursdays was a
must. He was a passionate and flamboyant
lecturer. He would stride up and down the
lecture theatre waving his arms to stress a
point and swirling his gown. His favourite
subject was entailment. 
In weekly private supervision at his
home in de Freville Avenue he was always
interested and positive in his comment on
the weekly undergraduate essay.
His association with Cambridge
happened almost by chance in the years
before the Second World War. A
combination of the deteriorating
international situation and the inspiration
of Broad, Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein
prompted him to abandon his homeland
and take the BA degree in Cambridge with
first class honours in 1939.
For us students it was particularly
exciting to discuss the problems of
philosophy with someone who had studied
under those great Cambridge names.
I remember asking one of the senior
Trinity fellows why Casimir was not a
fellow and happily the situation was
rectified soon after. All Casimir’s pupils
and admirers are pleased and proud that
the Faculty of Philosophy Library bears his
name.
Cartoon by Jana Diemberger
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Certainly formative years for me – and
ones which I like to think had an
application in the Civil Service, at least
while policy analysis outweighed spin.
From Professor Ian Hacking (Trinity,
1956) Professor of Philosophy at The
Institute for the History and Philosophy
of Science and Technology, University of
Toronto, also Professor in Philosophy
and the History of Scientific Concepts
at the Collège de France, Paris
I should like to tell an anecdote only I
can tell. It is about the old Moral Sciences
Library, as it was still called in 1956. It is
also about the arrival of Imre Lakatos in
Cambridge. Lakatos got out of Hungary at
the age of 34, was picked up by the
Rockefeller foundation in Vienna, and
supported doing a doctorate in Cambridge,
with Richard Braithwaite. Lots of people
came to hate Imre, or found him
dangerously difficult to get on with; others
have found discreditable things in his
Hungarian past. There are plenty of people
in Budapest today, to whom it is not wise
to mention the name of Lakatos. I am not
going to discuss such weighty issues.
Personally we got on fine, and I do know
that Proofs and Refutations is one of the
great philosophical dialogues of all time.
Here was my first vision of Lakatos. I
too arrived in Cambridge in 1956, a
gauche colonial at Trinity, starting two
years as an affiliated student for what was
still called the Moral Sciences Tripos. In
those days the Moral Sciences Library was
housed in a dingy room, an antiquated and
dusty collection that no one had troubled
to keep up. A few years later Jonathan
Bennett had most of the books thrown out,
and later we had the Sidgwick Avenue site,
and the more simply named Philosophy
Faculty.
One day in the autumn of 1956 I was
writing a weekly essay alone in the library,
too shy to be anywhere else. Then an
amazing apparition entered the room. A
short scowling man wearing a suit, shiny
with years of wear. Greenish, I think, but
maybe just green with age. I had probably
A nice cartoon
appeared on the
board in the
common room:
which prompted 
the question:
and got the reply:
Recollections
Popper and the poker
Timothy Smiley
At the Moral Sciences Club in October
1946 the speaker was Karl Popper, the
chairman Ludwig Wittgenstein, and
Bertrand Russell was in the audience. In
1969 Popper wrote this account:
‘I went on to say that if I thought
there were no genuine philosophical
problems, I would certainly not be a
philosopher; and that the fact that many
people, or perhaps all people,
thoughtlessly adopt untenable solutions
to many, or perhaps all, philosophical
problems provided the only justification
for being a philosopher. Wittgenstein
jumped up again, interrupting me, and
spoke at length about puzzles and the
nonexistence of philosophical problems.
At a moment which appeared to be
appropriate, I interrupted him, giving a
list I had prepared of philosophical
problems, such as: Do we know things
through our senses?, Do we obtain our
knowledge by induction? These
Wittgenstein dismissed as being logical
rather than philosophical. I then referred
to the problem whether potential or
perhaps even actual infinities exist, a
problem he dismissed as mathematical.
(This dismissal got into the minutes.) I
then mentioned moral problems and the
problem of the validity of moral rules.
At that point Wittgenstein, who was
sitting near the fire and had been
nervously playing with the poker, which
he sometimes used like a conductor’s
baton to emphasize his assertions,
challenged me: “Give an example of a
moral rule!” I replied: “Not to threaten
visiting lecturers with pokers”.
Whereupon Wittgenstein, in a rage,
threw the poker down and stormed out
of the room, banging the door behind
him. I really was very sorry. I admit that
I went to Cambridge hoping to provoke
Wittgenstein into defending the view
that there are no genuine philosophical
problems, and to fight him on this issue.
But I had never intended to make him
angry; and it was a surprise to find him
unable to see a joke.’
There matters rested until 1998,
when a memoir of Popper by John
Watkins triggered a heated
correspondence in the TLS. Peter Geach
criticised him for repeating ‘an old story
of Karl Popper’s about how
Wittgenstein threatened (sic) Popper
with a poker’. Two other eye-witnesses
joined in. Sir John Vinelott endorsed
Popper’s account, including the famous
exchange, but it is not mentioned in
Peter Munz’s letter. He has an over-
excited Wittgenstein, bad-tempered at
being contradicted, waving a ‘red-hot
poker’ in front of Popper’s face,
whereupon Russell ‘took his pipe out of
his mouth and said in his high-pitched,
scratchy voice: “Wittgenstein, put down
that poker at once!” Wittgenstein
obeyed and, after a short time, got up
and stormed out of the room’. The
divergence between eye-witness
recollections is a commonplace. Less
often remarked is their compelling
quality – how people cannot believe that
anyone could honestly have seen things
differently. ‘Popper is a liar’ whose story
is ‘false from beginning to end’ said
Geach, while Munz said ‘Geach saw and
heard all this as clearly as I did, and it is
incomprehensible that, out of mistaken
loyalty to Wittgenstein, he should now
deny that the incident happened’.
Two journalists, David Edmonds and
John Eidinow, like the Cold Case Team
of detectives on television, set out to
discover what really happened fifty
years earlier, and published the result in
their book Wittgenstein’s Poker. Their
verdict is that Popper’s account is a
fabrication. They prepare the ground in
two ways. They go back as far as the
Vienna of the 20s and 30s to build up a
picture of a resentful, academically
marginalised Popper socially and
intellectually obsessed (their word) by
an aristocratic, successful Wittgenstein.
They are brilliant story-tellers but their
picture is a caricature, designed to
supply what Norman Malcolm called
‘plausible reasons why it was so
important for Popper to have laid claim
to victory in this brief encounter’. They
also impugn Popper’s credibility by a
series of unsupported assertions and
innuendos. For example, they quote
him as noticing a girl next day reading
a review of The Open Society. Failing
after a brief search to find a review
fitting the date, they ask pointedly
‘Could this “memory” of Popper’s also
be false?’. But he did not mention a
review; he said ‘an attack’. They were
looking for the wrong thing.
As to the central incident, they judge
it likely that anything so dramatic
would have got into the minutes (as if
the poor secretary would pillory his
own PhD supervisor!). Then they argue
that in Popper’s version Wittgenstein’s
demand for an example of a moral rule
‘comes out of nowhere, quite at odds
with the run of the dialogue’. On the
contrary, if Popper was following his
previous offerings of specific problems
with a more general one, what could be
more natural than for his interlocutor
to ask for an example? And if
Wittgenstein did not put the question,
who did? They opt for Richard
Braithwaite, some time after
Wittgenstein’s departure; but they do
not realise the implications.
Braithwaite’s question cannot have
come out of nowhere. So either Popper
has just said something like ‘Here’s a
problem I forgot to mention earlier’, or
he had indeed presented the problem to
Wittgenstein, but Wittgenstein, who
had challenged every one of his
previous offerings, simply ignored it.
This is too much much to swallow.
Edmonds and Eidinow have gone too
far in trying to provide a satisfying
twist. Who wants a detective story in
which the prime suspect’s confession
turns out to be true after all? If I were
looking for a twist I would ask who in
the room was most likely to produce in
a flash the quip about the poker; the
answer being, of course, Russell. Alas,
the facts don’t allow it. But several
witnesses do report an exchange
between Russell and Wittgenstein, and
Watkins’ memoir finds a plausible place
for it. After Popper’s retort ‘there was
laughter, and Wittgenstein stormed out,
angrily declaring as he went that Popper
was confusing the issues; whereupon
Russell called out, “Wittgenstein, you’re
the one who’s causing the confusion”’.
Popper doesn’t mention it, but why
should he? I do not pretend to have
cleared up all the confusion surrounding
the meeting, but I see no reason to
doubt the truth of his account.
Timothy Smiley FBA 
Emeritus Knightbridge Professor of
Philosophy
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Sir Karl Popper
(1902–1994)
Ludwig Wittgentsein
(1889–1951)
Many members of the Faculty have had their achievements
recognized by awards, elections and invitations to give major lecture
series, as well as symposia being held on aspects of their work.
These include: Simon Blackburn is Gifford Lecturer 2004 at the
University of Glasgow. The Political Science Association held a
symposium on Raymond Geuss’ work in political philosophy at its
conference in Lincoln in April 2004. Ross Harrison is Invited
Academic Visitor at the Department of Government, London School
of Economics. Derek Matravers has been elected Affiliated Lecturer
to the Faculty. 
Hugh Mellor has been elected Honorary Fellow of the Australian
Academy of the Humanities. Alex Oliver was awarded a
Leverhulme Trust Major Research Fellowship. Onora O’Neill has
been made an Honorary Professor of the University. She has also
recently been elected Foreign Member of the Royal Irish Academy
and Foreign Corresponding Member of the Austrian Academy of
Science. 
Michael Potter is at the moment AHRB Senior Research Fellow
at the University of Stirling and recently a Philosophy of
Mathematics Conference in St Andrews devoted a symposium to his
book Reason’s Nearest Kin. Dominic Scott has just completed his
British Academy Research Readership and was a recent winner of
the University Pilkington teaching prize. Jan Westerhoff, who has
recently completed his PhD, has won the first prize in the
competition for research in ontology and metaphysics of the
Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie.
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notion links brain processes of
perception to methods of science in an
interesting way. Is it best judged by
scientists or philosophers? I would
look to the skills of philosophy for
assessing internal coherence of ideas; 
to science for coherence to the way
things are.
Has reading philosophy at
Cambridge been useful? It was a
wonderful experience to live in the
centre of the known – and especially
the unknown – Universe, especially at
the time of Lord Adrian in physiology
and the discovery of DNA, when
Francis Crick with his atom-smashing
laugh was very much in evidence. But
was it directly useful? It gave one the
courage (and on good days the skill) to
challenge accepted ideas and attempt
to clear confusions, which psychology
being so difficult and so little
understood were (and in spite of my
humble efforts, are!) plentiful. The
issue I looked at first, was localisation
of brain functions. How could
functions be localised when we didn’t
know how the brain works, and so
what the functions are? Rather more
subtle: from changing or removing part
of an interacting system, how is it
possible to see from changes of
performance what that part was doing?
Unfortunately some of my friends
engaged in these experiments saw this
as an attack on what they were doing:
it was intended as a help for
interpreting what they found. These
arguments have often been quoted
since – and perhaps more often
ignored!
But I have been more concerned
with getting evidence, for or against,
philosophical positions; most
dramatically the study of a case of
adult recovery from infant blindness,
almost certainly from birth – following
Molyneux’s Question raised by John
Locke, which I read as a student:
‘Suppose a man born blind, and now
adult, and taught by his touch to
distinguish between a cube and sphere
… and the blind man made to see …
query whether by his sight … could he
distinguish and tell which was the
globe and which the cube?’ 
We found some surprising instant
vision, with something not anticipated
by philosophers: he could immediately
use his knowledge from touch, to read
capital letters, and tell the time.
Transfer from touch introduces
another dimension to the issue of what
these rare cases can tell us of the basis
and status of perception. Didn’t
Wittgenstein say that all new
knowledge comes from science? This
does not make philosophy useless – if
only because it is as important to see
the conceptual significance of data, as
it is to establish statistical significance
for believing them.
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Professor Richard Gregory FRS
(Downing, 1947)
Honorary Fellow of Corpus Christi
and Downing Colleges, Cambridge.
Sometime Lecturer in Experimental
Psychology, Cambridge;
now Emeritus Professor of
Neuropsychology, University of
Bristol
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